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Birmingham, UK (Orcid:0000-0002-1693-1999)The true (full) cost of a utility strike incident is rarely known. Generally, only the direct costs are used to measure
the impact of utility strikes; the wider indirect and social costs are rarely quantiﬁed in monetary terms. Moreover, no
established methodology exists to address this gap in knowledge, while access to fully documented records often
presents the greatest challenge. This paper presents research that for the ﬁrst time has been given access to 16 fully
detailed utility strike case studies in UK urban areas. The research has identiﬁed and assessed the impacts of these
utility strikes and provided an objective estimation of their associated (total) costs. These costs consist of those paid
directly by the utility owner (direct costs), those borne by third parties in the contractual agreement (indirect costs)
and those borne by other parties not engaged in the contractual agreement (social costs). Although the richness lies
in the detailed case studies, the aggregated ﬁndings from all 16 utility strike case studies indicate that the total cost
ratio – the ratio of indirect and social costs to the direct cost of repair – is 29:1. Thus there is a very substantial
impact, which to date has been largely neglected.Notation
j day within a 24 h trafﬁc ﬂow segment
R2 coefﬁcient of determination
s trafﬁc segment within 24 h trafﬁc ﬂow cycle
Introduction
A wide range of equipment and operational procedures are utilised
in street works to repair, replace and maintain buried infrastructure,
including pipes and cables, chosen to satisfy project costs ﬁrst and
maximise proﬁts, in addition to meeting operational time
constraints (Rogers et al., 2012). More often than not, access to
buried pipes and cables is achieved through excavation from the
surface using open trenches (ASCE, 2002; Metje et al., 2007), and
as such a utility strike is a constant risk due to the techniques
employed – for example, use of mechanical excavators. A utility
strike occurs when any element of the utility network infrastructure
is hit, leading to damage, during excavation (Usag, 2016), and can
be caused by a whole host of reasons, as illustrated in Figure 1.
A review of the literature (Hunt et al., 2014; Jung and Sinha,
2007; McMahon et al., 2005; Moran et al., 2017; Ormsby, 2009;
Woodroffe and Ariaratnam, 2008) shows that a variety of terms
have been used to deﬁne the different costs related to buried asset
infrastructure, and rather confusingly, several studies have usedidentical terms to deﬁne different types of costs. For clarity, it is
therefore necessary to deﬁne clearly the terminology prior to
examining the costs themselves. For the purposes of this study,
the costs of buried asset infrastructure will be cost estimated
under the following three categories: direct costs (DCs), indirect
costs (ICs) and social costs (SCs).
When a utility strike incident happens, the utility owner often
incurs the direct construction costs of the strike incident – that is,
planning, supervision, material, design and labour costs (Goodrum
et al., 2008; Metje et al., 2015). However, there are ICs, additional
costs associated with the contracts incurred by the utility company
and third parties due to, for example, loss of business income
(Bernold, 2003; Gilchrist and Allouche, 2005). SCs are those which
are a result of the street works, but which are borne by society and
the environment instead of the utility companies and include costs
to other businesses, increased levels of air pollution as well as
noise, damage to the environment and trafﬁc delays experienced by
road users due to the additional works, which are paid for by
society (McMahon et al., 2005). When combined, these DCs, ICs
and SCs are the ‘true costs’ linked to utility strike incidents.
Moreover, when taking account of works undertaken on or
beneath the highway, the division should be made between street1
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companies) and highway works (which are maintenance works
undertaken by the highway authorities). Predictably, costs will
arise with all such works, but the focus of this study is the costs
connected with buried asset infrastructure and so will of necessity
give attention to street works. In point of fact, most of the
literature on the disruptive consequences of road works tends to
concentrate on the effects of street works (Hunt et al., 2014; Jung
and Sinha, 2007; Matthews et al., 2015; McMahon et al., 2005;
Woodroffe and Ariaratnam, 2008).
More than 4 million holes are excavated in UK roads each year
(McMahon et al., 2005), with approximately 60 000 utility strikes
occurring annually in the UK alone (ICE, 2017), contrasted with
500 000 in the USA (Talmaki and Kamat, 2012), and with
increasing debates over trafﬁc congestion and its impacts on public
and private transport service disruption (Litman, 2017), local
authority austerity and the need to maintain services (Pike et al.,
2017) and the imperatives of urban sustainability and resilience
(Hunt et al., 2016; Makana et al., 2016a), research is needed
whose implications, and direction towards far more effective street
works, are potentially transformative (Clarke et al., 2017; Hojjati
et al., 2017; Makana et al., 2017; Rogers et al., 2017).2
ed by [ University of Birmingham] on [09/08/18]. Published with permission by The study herein presented is therefore the ﬁrst attempt on both
the national and international levels to put forward explicitly a
methodology for cost estimating through case studies the full
economic impact of utility strikes – that is, the sum of DCs, ICs
(if any) and SCs (if any) that are a by-product of a utility strike
incident. This paper presents research that for the ﬁrst time has
been given access to 16 fully detailed utility strike case studies in
a UK urban area. The research has identiﬁed and assessed the
impacts of these utility strikes and provided an estimation of their
associated costs. Perhaps more important still is the fact that the
evidence base presented in this paper, until now, has been non-
existent, with this paper ﬁlling the long-awaited evidence gap that
permits asset owners and other urban professionals to demand
changes towards safer and more sustainable, resilient and liveable
city practices (Rogers, 2018).
Literature review: cost estimation of utility
strikes
The debate in the infrastructure sector around the costs that arise
through utility strikes has been ongoing for a long time (Sanghvi,
1982), with little or no evidence to substantiate any estimates
conclusively until recently (Metje et al., 2015). Construction
industry contracts often do not account for the wider economicUtility strike causal factors
Sequencing, planning
and programming
Competence and
training
Physical site
considerations
Excavation technique
Service location activities not
programmed or resourced
Inappropriate training for the
correct competency levels for
specific tasks to be
undertaken
Use of generic method
statements
Inconsistent working practices
Poor work to dig permit
application system
Laborious management
procedures
Inaccurate statutory drawings
‘Them – us’ hierarchy in
organisation
Poor PPE or PPE not available
Inadequate tools (e.g.
excavators and drilling
machines)
Equipment not available/
improper use (e.g. Cat and
Genny)
Equipment
Training received on NRSWA
course provides an awareness
of location equipment and
techniques rather than
competency
No training for operatives on
how to interpret utilities on
drawings and plans
No training for operatives on
how to use Cat and Genny
properly (should be done by
utility survey experts and not
site operatives)
Potentially hazardous ground
conditions
(e.g. collapsible ground)
Previous incorrect cover
Utility encased in concrete
Adverse weather conditions
(e.g. heavy rain, freezing rain,
hail, sleet, snow)
No clear markers (e.g.
marking tape of existing
services)
Performance related pay/
chasing bonus
Inappropriate tools made
available
Did not use appropriate
geophysical methods to scan
at every depth to obtain a
horizontal position and/or
vertical position (against safe
system of work)
Cutting corners/laziness
Chasing management
measure
Rushing/work pressures
No trial holes or slip trenches
dug to confirm utilities
Training
Figure 1. The multiple causal factors of utility strikes in street works. NRSWA, New Roads and Street Works Act; PPE, personal protective
equipmentthe ICE under the CC-BY license 
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Downloaded bylosses resulting from utility strikes, which are experienced by
parties not involved in the contractual agreement (Broome and
Perry, 2002). This typically occurs because contractors and utility
owners seldom have to substantiate their selection of construction
methods and procedural routines based on any cost estimation
methodology that takes into account the costs borne by society
(Gilchrist and Allouche, 2005). ICs and SCs resulting from a
utility strike incident are generally not recorded, and the current
data collection and information management systems used in
industry do not capture the information that can estimate the total
costs of utility strikes in a systematic fashion (CGA, 2015; Metje
et al., 2015; Usag, 2016), hence the key impact of this research.
In infrastructure planning literature, there are currently attempts
to explicitly estimate the cost of the wider impact (DCs, ICs and
SCs combined) of utility strikes and straddle the interface between
the utilities project, the economic system and the socio-ecological
system in which the strike incident has occurred.
Within these limitations, Metje et al. (2015) presented the ﬁrst
attempt to compile a compendium of utility strike costs (3348
provided by four contractors, two clients and two utility
companies across the UK), centred speciﬁcally on the DCs
incurred. However, even here the ICs and SCs of each strike
incident were not taken into account and the need for an approach
allowing a wider range of costs was highlighted. Goodrum et al.
(2008) provided a similar attempt to estimate the impact of utility
conﬂicts (disruptions when utility installations are encountered
unexpectedly during construction) during construction projects
through statistical analysis of surveys from 45 different US states,
with the study focusing on detailing their frequency and severity,
in addition to four separate case studies, nested in the overall
study, in which utility strike incidents (or hits) were experienced,
and the resulting direct and ICs they brought about provided by [ University of Birmingham] on [09/08/18]. Published with permission by the ICthe utility company in question. However, the cost estimation
methodology behind each of these strike costs was not explained,
as these costs were provided by individual case study companies
and no SCs were accounted for. Moreover, several studies in the
USA have attempted to cost estimate (based on a cost–beneﬁt
analysis) potential utility management savings through a number
of approaches – for example, using subsurface utility engineering
– but no methodology for explicitly estimating the cost of the
wider impact of utility strikes was presented in any way (Bell et
al., 2014; Bernold, 2003; Goodrum et al., 2006; Jung and Sinha,
2007; Kraus et al., 2012; Lew, 2000; Osman and El-Diraby, 2005;
Sinha et al., 2007; Woodroffe and Ariaratnam, 2008). Other
relevant studies have attempted to assess how to cost estimate
utility strike incidents, but none have provided a methodology to
do so or estimated the total cost of any incident cases (Brady
et al., 2001; Çelik et al., 2017; CGA, 2015; Gilchrist and
Allouche, 2005; Hojjati et al., 2018; Hunt et al., 2014; Matthews
et al., 2015; McMahon et al., 2005; Moran et al., 2017; Najaﬁ
and Kim, 2004; Ormsby, 2009; Wang et al., 2008).
Methodological approach
The methodology used to estimate the cost of utility strikes is
illustrated in Figure 2, and more details are provided by Makana
et al. (2016b). Figure 2 shows the case study approach used that
focuses on each case study individually and then draws cross-
cutting conclusions, using utility strike cost indicators detailed in
Table 1 as the unit of analysis, drawing from the work of Yin
(2013), who sets out the general principles to be observed in case
study research design and methods. As a result, no clear rationale
distinction is drawn in the present study between the commonly
understood classic single-case study and multiple-case studies.
The three different phases of the ‘new approach’ utility strike cost
estimation methodology as shown in Figure 2 are summarised thePhase 1: Phase 2: Phase 3:
define and design prepare, collect and analyse analyse and conclude
Select cases
Cost estimation
of utility strikes
Design utility
strike cost
estimation and
data collection
protocols
Cost estimation
methods
Source of cost
estimation
evidence
Conduct
remaining utility
strike case studies
Write individual
utility strike case
reports
Write individual
utility strike case
reports
Write individual
utility strike case
reports
Write utility strike
cross-case report
Develop policy
implications
Estimate utility
strike cost ratios
Draw cross-case
conclusions
Total costs (DC, IC,
SC) of all case
studies
Conduct second
utility strike
case study
Conduct first utility
strike case study
Utility strike cost
indicators – DCs,
ICs and SCs
Figure 2. Utility strike new approach multiple-case study cost estimation methodology – adapted from Yin (2013)3
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Downloadsections headed ‘Phase 1: deﬁne and design’, ‘Phase 2: prepare,
collect and analyse’ and ‘Phase 3: analyse and conclude’.
Phase 1: deﬁne and design
For the deﬁne and design phase, the selection of utility strike case
studies is made and the focus in the selection process should be, if
possible, the selection of individual projects which include a mix
of utilities and a mix of projects ranging from simple to complex.
A key criterion (where possible) for the selection of cases is still
the use of interviews of key actors – for example, contractors –
thus providing important context as to why the utility strike
incident happened and the conditions around the incident on the
day. Moreover, interviews provide key information where a paper
record of the utility strike incident is not available.
The next important step requires the deﬁnition of cost estimation
measures for each utility strike case study. These measures are
shown in the study utility strike cost indicators, drawn from Table 1,
and have been grouped into DC, IC and SC indicators. A utility
strike cost indicator is deﬁned here as a ‘measurable cost which in
monetary terms can be quantiﬁed and is a consequence of one or
more utility strike-related negative impacts on the environments
surrounding a utilities project’ and affords the opportunity for
extensive analysis into a single case. A total of 22 representative4
ed by [ University of Birmingham] on [09/08/18]. Published with permission by cost indicators were carefully chosen from appropriate published
engineering literature (Bernold, 2003; Goodrum et al., 2008; Jung
and Sinha, 2007; Lew, 2000; McMahon et al., 2005; Metje et al.,
2015; Najaﬁ and Gokhale 2005; Osman and El-Diraby, 2005). The
following criteria were used to select cost indicators in this study.
■ Relevance: There is a clear relationship between utility strike
cost estimation and the indicator.
■ Usefulness: The indicator will point to areas of improvement
and helps capture information to facilitate moving utility
strike avoidance strategies, priorities or programming forward.
■ Feasibility: Cost estimation data for the indicator can be
obtained with reasonable and affordable effort.
■ Validity: To the extent possible, the indicator has been ﬁeld
tested and used in practice for cost estimation exercises
previously.
■ Distinctiveness: The indicator lacks redundancy and does not
duplicate measures captured by other indicators.
Table 1 shows the relationship between the utility strike cost
indicators, the cost estimation methods (direct and indirect) that could
be used to estimate the strike cost indicator and the multiple sources
of evidence that are available to establish a chain of evidence during
data collection. The cost estimation methods presented in Table 1 areTable 1. Examples of utility strike cost indicators that could occur when a utility strike incident happensCost category Utility strike cost indicator
Cost estimation,
possible methodsathe ICE under the CC-BYCost estimation evidence,
possible sourcesbDCsc Administrative costs (DC1) 1, 2 1, 3
Planning and design (DC2) 1, 2 1, 3, 4
Diversion of existing utility services (DC3) 3, 5 1, 4
Supervision of construction works (DC4) 3, 5 3, 4
Trafﬁc management (DC5) 5 3, 4
Material and construction costs (DC6) 3, 5 1–3
Cost of repair (DC7) 4 1–3ICsd Increased insurance premiums (IC1) — 1, 2
Regulatory ﬁnes (e.g. HSE) (IC2) — 1, 2
Damage to third-party apparatus (IC3) 5 3, 4
Programme overrun (IC4) 1, 2 1, 4
Loss of business income (IC5) 1, 2 1, 2
Compensation payments (IC6) 1, 2 1–3
Insurance excess payments (IC7) 5 1, 2
Damage to brand/image (IC8) 1, 2 1, 3–6
Cost of restoring brand/image (IC9) 2, 3, 8 1, 3, 5, 6SCse Trafﬁc delay costs (SC1) 4 3, 4
Costs to local business (SC2) 1–6 2, 3
Costs to highway (transport) users (SC3) 4, 6, 7 2, 3
Environmental costs (SC4) 2, 8 2, 3
Costs to highway authority (SC5) 4, 6, 7 2–5
Costs to local community (SC6) 6, 8 2, 5, 6aPartially after Gilchrist and Allouche (2005) and Tsunokawa and Hoban (1997). Direct methods: 1, loss of productivity; 2, human capital; 3, replacement cost; 4, lane closure
cost; 5, Spon’s price book (AECOM, 2017) (or similar country equivalent). Indirect methods: 6, hedonic pricing; 7, user delay cost; 8, contingent valuation technique
b1, company documents; 2, archival records; 3, open-ended interviews; 4, site visits – direct and participant; 5, structured interviews and surveys; 6, focus interviews
cCosts paid directly by contractors
dCosts borne by third parties in the contractual agreement
eCosts borne by other parties not engaged in the contractual agreement
The numbers in the ﬁrst column indicate the possible methods that can be used for cost estimation of the cost indicator; the numbers in the second column
indicate possible sources of cost estimation evidence
HSE, health and safety executive license 
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in which cost estimation can be approached. The most appropriate
cost estimation method is dependent on the nature of the utility strike
cost indicator being estimated. The cost estimation methods in the
literature can be grouped into two main classes, direct and indirect
methods, where DC estimation techniques are the most extensively
utilised methods since they are centred on market and measurable
indicator costs (e.g. cost of labour and cost of repair). As stated by
Gilchrist and Allouche (2005) in addition to Tsunokawa and Hoban
(1997), commonly used DC estimation techniques comprise but
are not limited to (a) loss of productivity, (b) human capital,
(c) replacement cost, (d) lane closure cost and (e) Spon’s price book
(or similar country equivalent). Conversely, IC estimation techniques
are used in situations where the cost indicator does not have a market
or measurable value in monetary terms (e.g. damage to brand image
and trafﬁc delay cost) and use of which allocates known market
values to the indicator in question to arrive at an approximate cost.
As stated by Gilchrist and Allouche (2005) in addition to Tsunokawa
and Hoban (1997), commonly used IC estimation techniques
comprise but are not limited to (a) hedonic pricing, (b) user delay
cost and (c) Contingent valuation technique. However, as illustrated
in the second column of Table 1, there will be instances when cost
estimating one or more utility strike cost indicators will not be
necessary based on other possible sources of cost estimation. This is
because a source of cost estimation evidence will already be
available and as such provides the DC estimation data sought for a
speciﬁc utility strike cost indicator, as the availability or otherwise of
cost estimation evidence is dependent on an existing paper trail.
Phase 2: prepare, collect and analyse
Here each individual utility strike case study comprises a ‘full’
study, in which convergence of cost estimation and multiple
information sources is sought with respect to the evidence and
deductions for the case.
A key feature of Figure 2 is the feedback loop (dashed line). These
loops characterise a typical scenario, where important ﬁndings were
discovered while analysing one of the individual case studies. Such a
ﬁnding could necessitate re-examination of one or more of the
study’s initial cost estimation (utility strike cost indicators) and data
collection protocols. At this stage, ‘case design restructuring’ ought
to take place prior to moving forward with the study. This redesign
could include modiﬁcations in the cost estimation and data collection
protocols. Following this approach, the risk of distortions within the
study is avoided, whereby ‘external validity’ is achieved through
consistent replication of case design rules, ‘reliability’ is achieved
through use of this consistent case study protocol and ‘construct
validity’ is achieved through execution of the study on this basis,
while collating multiple sources of evidence, which by consequence
establish a robust chain of proof for resultant cost estimates.
Phase 3: analyse and conclude
The ﬁnal phase involves cross-case synthesis of multiple cases.
Aggregation of all the case study ﬁndings will result in totals for
all cost estimates, for DC, IC and SC estimates. [ University of Birmingham] on [09/08/18]. Published with permission by the ICThese totals allow ratio analysis to be utilised with respect to IC/
DC, SC/DC and IC + SC/DC ratios and act as an effective tool for
identifying indicators of positive and negative utility strike cost
trends. More importantly, this allows policymakers to gain insight
into the differences over the supposed impact of utility strike
incidents and their true impact to both the industry and society. The
information that cost ratio trend analysis provides can be
accumulated over time as with other initiatives currently ongoing in
industry (e.g. CGA (2015) and Usag (2015, 2016)). The ratio
analysis additionally affords (a) the ability to judge the efﬁciency
of a company in a speciﬁc context concerning utility strikes; (b) the
ability to locate weakness of a company’s operations concerning
utility strikes; (c) the ability to help formulate plans based on the
understanding of past performance concerning utility strikes; and
(d) the ability to compare performance over different years and
compared with other companies within the same industry.
Characteristics of the selected utility strike
case studies
This study focused on 16 case studies collected over 6 months
(October 2014 to March 2015), where utility strikes were
experienced and in which a mix of utility types and size of the
associated projects were involved. Appendix 1 provides a detailed
context on the 16 case studies. Several site visits where undertaken
for data capture and application of the new approach methodology
(see Figure 2 and the section headed ‘Results and discussion’).
Table 2 shows a breakdown of the different types of utility
damaged in the 16 case studies, with electricity cables and gas
pipelines being most represented. More information on the
breakdown of utility strikes in the UK by type can be found in the
paper by Metje et al. (2015) and the report by Usag (2016). Table 2
correspondingly shows the different types of excavation tools being
used when a strike incident occurred. From Table 2 it is clear that
mini diggers cause by far the highest number of utility strike
incidents in the 16 case studies, which is in contrast to the ﬁndings
by Metje et al. (2015), who found that hand tools were the most
common, but the low number of cases presented herein may
explain the differences. All but one (94%) of the case studies
reviewed had statutory drawings available before excavation,
which were of variable quality, mostly presented in black and
white, and often hard to read. These limitations were considered to
be a signiﬁcant contributory factor as to why the strike incidents
occurred in the case studies. Of the statutory drawings available, six
(37%) accurately showed the location of utility services and seven
(44%) did not accurately show their location, while the accuracy of
the remainder (three; 19%) was not recorded.
Table 2 further shows whether the utilities were encased in concrete
or directly buried in the ground. Services encased in concrete
considerably increased the likelihood of a utility strike incident, as
did cases in which services were not at the speciﬁed depth. Most
companies in this study employ a safe dig best practice – that is, an
exclusion zone for untraceable utility services. Where services cannot
be detected by the use of a cable avoidance tool (Cat) scanner (e.g.5
E under the CC-BY license 
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Downloadpolyethylene (PE) gas and water pipes, pot-ended electricity cables),
where no as-built information was available and where there was no
visible indication of the presence of buried services from the surface
(i.e. valves or chambers), an automatic 600mm red exclusion zone is
used when excavating either side of the expected service location
regardless of depth. The methodological approach described in the
section headed ‘Methodological approach’ is applied in the section
headed ‘Results and discussion’ to the 16 utility strike case study
incidents.
Results and discussion
Utility strike incidents are unique with respect to the wider
adverse impacts that each one causes – that is, their true cost.
Table 3 provides a summary of all the case study ﬁndings
(presented in Table 2) and is intended to give broad indications or
estimations of the costs of utility strikes. It therefore provides a
baseline for estimating potential costs and brings to focus the true
cost of strike incidents. However, details of both the works carried
out to rectify the situation once the strike has occurred and the
context – the surrounding urban fabric and activities and
the nature of the disruption to them – are necessary to understand
the cost calculations and how they might be translated to other
sites where utility strikes have occurred.
Accordingly, Appendix 1 (Table 4) provides the essential details
for the case studies, although even with this detail, extrapolation
and translation will remain at best approximate because every
incident and subsequent activities and impacts will be to some
degree unique. This is where the difﬁculty arises in making a case
for changes in practice and governance – individual cases provide
an insufﬁciently strong evidence base for far-reaching change.
The current paper has measured factual impacts and aims to6
ed by [ University of Birmingham] on [09/08/18]. Published with permission by provide the missing robustness to this evidence base, being
founded on a relatively large number of cases. Importantly the
strength of this approach makes a compelling case for accurate
detection of buried utilities in addition to the development of safe
digging practices and the use of alternative working practices.
Nevertheless, engineering judgement is required to diagnose the full
impacts and take into account fully the context in which the
disruption has occurred and hence enable the ﬁndings to be
translated to other situations. In this respect, the apparently highly
approximate accounting of additional impacts (i.e. those due the
adverse impacts of queuing trafﬁc, such as noise pollution, air
pollution, loss of business and health and safety issues) is helpful,
since adjustment of the evidence base can be made on the basis of
the contextual information provided and equally allowance can be
made in determining costs for any other particular case under
consideration. The use of engineering judgement is to be
encouraged, therefore, but on the understanding that the assumptions
used in arriving at this judgement are made explicit and therefore
the evidence on which the judgement is made is wholly transparent.
The 100% stacked column graph in Figure 3 compares the
percentage that each cost category (direct, indirect and social)
contributes to the total true cost to emphasise the different
proportions. The ratio expresses the mathematical relationship
between IC, SC and DC as expressed in the equation
utility strike cost ratio ¼ IC þ SCð Þ=DC1.
It can be seen that the DC of the remedial works does not account
for half the total cost in any of the case studies. It should be notedTable 2. Characteristics of the 16 utility strike case studiesCase study
numberUtility
typeExcavation
tool usedCable/pipe
encased in
concreteStatutory drawings
available prior to
excavationthe ICE under the CC-BYStatutory
drawings
accurate license Cat and Gennya
(or similar) used
before excavation1 Water Diamond drill No Yes Yes No
2 E – LV Mini digger N/A Yes N/A No
3 E – LV Mini digger Yes Yes Yes Yes
4 Telecoms Mini digger No Yes Yes N/A
5 E – LV Mini digger Yes Yes Yes Yes
6 E – LV Mini digger No Yes N/A Yes
7 Gas LP Mini digger Yes Yes No Yes
8 E – LV 360 excavator Yes Yes Yes Yes
9 E – LV Air-powered
hand tool
Yes Yes No Yes10 E – LV Air-powered
hand toolYes Yes No No11 Gas HP Mini digger No Yes Yes Yes
12 Gas LP Mini digger Yes N/A No N/A
13 E – LV Mini digger Yes Yes No Yes
14 Gas HP Mini digger Yes Yes No Yes
15 Water Mini digger Yes Yes No No
16 E – HV Mini digger Yes Yes No NoE – HV, electricity high voltage; E – LV, electricity low voltage; Gas HP, gas high pressure; Gas LP, gas low pressure
aCat and Genny (signal generator) (PAS 128:2014 (BSI, 2014), level 2 equivalent)
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Downloaded bythat by normalising the costs for each case study with respect to
the total cost (see Figure 3), information on the size of the costs is
lost. Based on the costs derived from each case study, it is
possible to determine the ratio of indirect and socials cost to the
DCs incurred
utility strike cost ratio ¼ IC þ SCð Þ=DC
¼ 220 140 þ 1 530 893ð Þ=59 804
≈ 29
2.
Thus, indirect and SCs are on average 29 times larger than the
DC of repair incurred to resolve the strike. It could be argued that
the robustness of this ratio could be improved with the addition of
more case studies, yet the ratios are almost universally likely to
prove underestimates of the full impacts of the works.
The more immediate observation from Figure 3 is that the
quantiﬁed true costs of utility strikes in the UK is far more than
what was previously thought on the basis of industry calculations;
see the paper of Metje et al. (2015). As Figure 3 shows, the DC of
remedial works, which is consistently at present the only recorded
cost for strike incidents, is often a small proportion of the true cost
and is sometimes almost negligible in comparison (e.g. case studies
4, 5 and 11–16). In practice, if the proposed methodology was [ University of Birmingham] on [09/08/18]. Published with permission by the ICapplied and the utility strike cost ratio (29:1) was extrapolated to all
utility strikes in the UK, the case for far greater emphasis on
preventative measures would be so overwhelming, leading to
changes in both governance and industry practices (with 60 000
incidents occurring annually in the UK (ICE, 2017), and a
conservative estimate of £500 of direct repair costs (Metje et al.,
2015) would result in a total cost of £870 million).
It is clear from the case study ﬁndings that road trafﬁc congestion
is the main contributor to several of the SCs identiﬁed in this
study – in particular road user delay, delay to train commute times
and the costs to businesses from lost productivity and business
income (see Table 3 and the report of Makana et al. (2016b) for
more details). Yet to emphasise the point made earlier, while the
speciﬁc impact of utility strikes on road user delay costs has been
investigated in some detail, a deeper understanding of other
congestion-related costs would strengthen the evidence base and
the case for change in favour of minimising disruption to citizens.
An obvious counter argument for change is that the cost of street
works might rise, and this cost would be passed onto the
customers, yet this misses the essential point made by Hayes et al.
(2012) that there is ‘one customer’ in all this – the ICs and SCs
are ultimately paid by the same citizens who receive a marginal
saving by avoiding the costs of the ‘externalities’ (i.e. the ICs and
SCs) of remedial street works on their utility bills. The logical
conclusion of this line of thinking, therefore, is that citizensTable 3. Summary of case study utility strike costs – direct, indirect and socialCase study Strike cost indicators estimateda
Utility
typeDC: £E under thIC: £e CC-BY SC: £license Ratio:
IC/DCRatio:
SC/DCRatio: IC +
SC/DC1 DC2, DC4, DC6, DC7, IC4 Water 750 2 000 — 2·67 — —
2 DC2, DC4, DC6, DC7, IC4 E – LV 1 675 2 000 — 1·19 — —
3 DC2, DC4, DC6, DC7, IC4 E – LV 1 400 2 000 — 1·43 — —
4b DC2, DC4, DC6, DC7, SC1 Telecoms 680 — 602 698 — 886·32 —
5b DC2, DC4, DC6, DC7, SC1 E – LV 1 275 — 41 128 — 32·26 —
6 DC2, DC4, DC6, DC7, IC4 E – LV 1 780 2 000 — 1·12 — —
7 DC2, DC4, DC6, DC7, IC4 Gas LP 1 000 2 000 — 2 — —
8 DC2, DC4, DC6, DC7, IC4 E – LV 969 2 000 — 2·06 — —
9 DC2, DC4, DC6, DC7, IC4 E – LV 2 500 5 500 — 2·2 — —
10 DC2, DC4, DC6, DC7, IC4 E – LV 4 000 5 000 — 1·25 — —
11c DC1, DC2, DC4, DC5, DC6, DC7, IC4, SC1,
SC3, SC4, SC6
Gas HP 7 800 105 000 173 032 13·46 22·18 35·6512c DC1, DC2, DC4, DC5, DC6, DC7, IC4, SC1 Gas LP 3 475 6 000 82 256 1·73 23·67 25·40
13 DC2, DC3, DC4, DC6, DC7, IC3, IC5, IC8,
SC2
E – LV 7 500 10 000 146 500 1·33 19·53 20·9014 DC1, DC2, DC3, DC4, DC5, DC6, DC7, IC3,
IC4, IC5, IC6, IC8Gas HP 5 000 76 640 — 15·33 — —15 DC1, DC2, DC4, DC6, DC7, IC4, IC5, IC8,
IC9, SC2, SC3, SC6Water 10 000 25 000 414 779 2·5 41·48 43·9816 DC1, DC2, DC3, DC4, DC6, DC7, IC4, IC5,
SC2E – HV 10 000 75 000 70 500 7·5 7·05 17·55Total and
averagesd— — 59 804 220 140 1 530 893 3·68 25·60 29·28E – HV, electricity high voltage; E – LV, electricity low voltage; Gas HP, gas high pressure; Gas LP, gas low pressure
aRefer to Table 1 for more details
bCase studies where trafﬁc delays experienced were quantiﬁed without a 40% additional cost as shown in Appendix 2
cCase studies where trafﬁc delays experienced were quantiﬁed with a 40% additional cost as shown in Appendix 2, to account for adverse environmental impacts
experienced
dThe totals and averages are calculated for all 16 utility strike case studies7
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Downloadwould almost certainly welcome a small extra cost invested to
reduce greatly the likelihood of utility strikes rather than paying
the far larger ICs and SCs of the consequences of not doing so.
Moreover, this would lead to hidden, or uncosted, beneﬁts such as
a general enhancement of citizen well-being (Leach et al., 2016).
A different approach is needed to move thinking away from the
traditional views of utility strike impacts centred on the DC of repair
and more importantly make the business case for the upfront
investment required by PAS 128:2014 surveys (BSI, 2014). The new
approach methodology developed herein helps to bridge this ‘gap in
knowledge’ by taking a view beyond the direct construction works
(and costs) to include impacts on the three pillars of sustainability:
the economy, the environment and society. Although some social and
even some environmental costs (in spite of the recent work on
natural capital impacts (Natural England, 2016)) are difﬁcult to
monetise, such a shift in thinking relies on attempts to cost estimate
in monetary terms the true cost – that is, make explicit the full
impact of a utility strike incident using a common baseline.
Conclusions
This paper describes the development of the new approach
methodology – a novel multi-case study approach to cost8
ed by [ University of Birmingham] on [09/08/18]. Published with permission by estimation of the true cost of utility strike incidents. The
methodology was applied as a proof of concept to 16 utility strike
case study incidents in dense urban environments, this
representing an unprecedented evidence base in the published
literature and one that therefore has the potential for a profound
impact on policy and governance.
The overall true cost ratio, determined by summing the primary ICs
and SCs deriving from remedial works following a utility strike and
comparing them to the DCs of the remedial works, when averaged
out over all the 16 case studies, amounted to 29:1. This ﬁnding
highlights the very considerable cost of utility strikes beyond DCs.
However, it should be noted that since the case studies all occurred
in dense urban areas, it is likely that this cost ratio is an
underestimate, since additional adverse effects that utility strikes can
have on the environment, citizens’ quality of life, the operation of
businesses and so on will not have been adequately included.
The size of the discrepancy between the DCs of remedial works,
which are typically the only costs recorded by the utilities
industry, and the ‘total costs’ has been emphasised by normalising
the different costs on a 100% stacked column graph for each case
study with respect to the total cost. The DC accounts for less than100%
90%
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10%
0%
Case study 1 Case study 2 Case study 3 Case study 4 Case study 5 Case study 6 Case study 7 Case study 8 Case study 9 Case study 10 Case study 11 Case study 12 Case study 13 Case study 14 Case study 15 Case study 16
DC IC SC
Utility strike cost ratio = 29:1
Example: Assuming you have a strike incident with a DC of £1000, that would mean as a rule of thumb that the true
cost (DC + IC + SC) is £29 000, based on the case study findings.
IC + SC 1 751 033
59 804DC
29==Utility strike (case studies 1–16) cost ratio =
Figure 3. Utility strike cost ratio from the 16 case studiesthe ICE under the CC-BY license 
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Downloaded by50% of the total cost in all the case studies, and in half of the
cases, it forms an almost negligible proportion (6% or less). Lack
of knowledge of where utilities were buried and utilities being
encased in concrete contributed to 75% of the 16 strike case study
incidents, implying that improved survey practices could have
helped to avoid the strikes occurring. Moreover, the separate
indirect to direct, and social to direct, cost ratios provide
important evidence on which to base improved site practices.
The successful application of the methodology on the 16 utility
strike case studies demonstrates that it is a suitable tool for
facilitating improved decision-making based on an economic
imperative for utilities management and planning. The evidence
base that this research has created, and in particular the
underpinning details of the strike incidents, remedial works and
urban context in which they were carried out, provides an
invaluable resource against which to make engineering [ University of Birmingham] on [09/08/18]. Published with permission by the ICjudgements for the assessment and cost estimation of the true cost
of utility strike incidents for any particular case or site elsewhere.
It also enables reﬁnement, again using engineering judgement, of
the calculations, which have deliberately used a simple and
transparent methodology in each case. More importantly, it
provides the basis for political interventions and a change in the
governance of street works to bring about a better, and cheaper,
outcome for the citizens who beneﬁt from the utility services and
an undisrupted transport and urban environment.
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for Assessing the Underworld (Grant Reference EP/K021699/1).Table 4. Contextual information for the case studies (continued on next page)Case
study
numberUtility strike contextE under the CCUtility strike incident1 There was a error of judgement and a failure to observe fully the permit to
dig procedure, and safe digging’ practices were not observed on a
construction site adjacent a bridge. The remedial works did not unduly
disturb trafﬁcWhile diamond drilling concrete slab to enable quiet
demolition, the core drill cut through a 25mm water
supply2 The night shift supervisor noticed at about 2.30 a.m. that trafﬁc warning
sign bulb had gone out. He went to investigate and discovered a damaged
cable and stopped works. The operator did not follow the safe system of
work. Works in the immediate area were suspended and sandbags were
used to make the area safe temporally. The remedial works did not unduly
disturb trafﬁcWhen excavating the operative lost control of the mini
digger and struck an LV street light cable3 Workmen were pulling out concrete bedding from kerbs. A cable feeding a
lit street sign was encased within the concrete. This came out with the
concrete, and a pop sound was heard. The cable was known about due to
a taped-off electrical pole socket nearby in the footpath. The remedial
works did not unduly disturb trafﬁcWhen pulling out concrete kerbs, an electrical lit LV
street sign cable embedded in concrete was snagged4 Prior to opening the tunnel to trafﬁc, it was conﬁrmed by London Streets
Tunnels Operation Centre (LSTOC) that they had a fault on communication
to the gantry on the westbound tunnel and could not control the matrix
signs on the gantry, which was operated manually to allow the tunnel to
be opened to the public. Further investigation revealed that a
communication cable that was believed to be part of the disconnected
cables was cut. It was later found to be the live communication control
cable of the western gantry. The remedial works disturbed trafﬁc ﬂow in
the tunnel and surrounding area for near enough a full dayHuman error – a live communication cable was
accidentally cut
The contractor had to contact LSTOC for an update
on any faults on the system which will allow time to
rectify them before the end of the shift5 While attempting to remove a street lighting control cabinet, an LV signal cable
was heard sparking in the ground. Despite service plans being available and a
Cat scan being carried out, the cable was not identiﬁed as it was encased in
concrete. The remedial works disturbed trafﬁc in the area for 4 hThe LV cable was encased in concrete and was not
detected when using a Cat. As the control cabinet
was moved, it became apparent that the cable had
been damaged by a mini digger6 The operative was breaking/excavating behind kerbs to install a duct for a
trafﬁc signal – an LV cable was struck 150mm below footpath surface in
hard ground. The remedial works did not unduly disturb trafﬁcWhen installing ducting, the operative lost control of
the pneumatic spade and struck an exposed LV cable7 The gas pipe was buried approximately 150mm below the surface material. It
was not identiﬁed on statutory plans or identiﬁed during scanning due to the
plastic pipe material. The remedial works did not unduly disturb trafﬁcDuring trial hole excavation using a hand breaker, an
LP gas pipe was accidentally struck. The works were
stopped until the gas pipe was reinstatedAppendix 19
-BY license 
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study
number0
 by [ UnivUtility strike contextersity of Birmingham] on [09/08/18]. Published with permission by the ICE under tUtility strike incident8 The cable was identiﬁed on statutory plans, and a Cat was used to verify this.
A lump of concrete was lifted using a machine when the duct and cable were
damaged. The remedial works did not unduly disturb trafﬁcWhile excavating to lay cable ducts, a 4 mm LV street
lighting cable was damaged9 Apparatus undertakers asked the contractor to dig a trial hole around an
existing 6″ (152mm) water pipe along a footpath. This trial hole was
needed to determine a tie-in location for a new rider main. The tie-in
works were planned for night time. The work started at 2 a.m. The
remedial works did not unduly disturb trafﬁcThere was 60mm depth of paving and below these
slabs approximately 300mm of concrete. This meant
that operatives had to use an air-powered breaker to
excavate the trial hole. While breaking the concrete,
a 50mm black LV duct was breached by the air-
powered breaker. There was no spark as the cable
was not live. The contractor halted the trial hole until
a repair was undertaken. UK Power Networks came
to site at 3 a.m. and isolated the cable permanently
by installing a shrink wrap end cap which proved the
cable was dead10 The service in question was not shown on the drawing accompanying the
permit to dig. Prior to the possible cable strike, there was a black cable in
ducting uncovered, of which the ducting appeared to have been
damaged. This was also not on the drawing. The remedial works did not
unduly disturb trafﬁcThe LV cable in question was surrounded in a sharp
sand and cement mixture with no indications such as
ducting, sand or hazard tape present. It was struck
using a pneumatic spade11 Work was being carried out to divert an existing 18″ (0·457m) HP gas
distribution main prior to further works. Uncompacted reinstatement
material from previous work carried out by the contractor, which had been
supported by this shoring, pressed against the top number of sheet piles,
pivoting them and creating a gap which allowed a small volume of
material to slump into the excavation. The remedial works severely
disturbed trafﬁc and businesses in the area for approximately 3 weeksWhile a 12m length of 500mm PE HP gas main was
being lowered into the excavation, a section of
shoring failed12 Two utility operatives were excavating a trench at a busy junction in order to
lay a duct for a future HV cable when a strike incident happened. The
remedial works disturbed trafﬁc in the areaConsidering the LP gas pipe to be dead, following checks
undertaken by utility operatives from the subcontractor
for the main contractor, the operatives decided to
break the pipe. The pipe was subsequently found to be
live, resulting in uncontrolled loss of gas. The utility
operatives from the subcontractor attended the site to
seal the broken pipe temporally. A cordon was placed
around the work compound to control members of the
public, and the local restaurant was warned13 While breaking out the slab, a cable was struck by a breaker, causing a ﬂash
of light/ﬁre to be emitted. It was soon after found that as a result of the
utility strike, power to businesses on two adjacent roads was lost from
9.30 a.m. to 5.10 p.m. (c. 6·5 h). The remedial works did not unduly
disturb trafﬁcWhile carrying out excavation works to determine a
route for the installation of the 180mm water main,
an LV cable was struck by a handheld breaker14 While carrying out excavation works for the construction of the mass
retaining wall on a busy street, a HP gas main was exposed adjacent to the
excavation. The remedial works did not unduly disturb trafﬁcA ﬂoor saw was used to cut the existing asphalt,
followed by the breakout of the underlying concrete
road base. During the breakout, the gas main was
exposed and punctured using a mini digger15 Information from the statutory undertaker proved to be incorrect on a
construction site. The drawing identiﬁed the water main to be at 1·3 m
below ground level and was subsequently struck at 1·6 m below ground
level. The remedial works disturbed underground train services as well as
water supply to two businesses in the areaA 100mm inner dia. water main was fractured with a
mini digger requiring repair. Minor water damage and
clean-up were required up to the train platform level16 Inaccurate buried service information was utilised to plan and implement
excavation works on a construction site, resulting in an inadequate risk
assessment and the development of associated control measures. The
remedial works affected power in the local area for half an hour, and a
nearby theatre performance was interruptedA handheld hydraulic breaker point pierced the outer
protective layer of an 11 kV HV cable, resulting in
damage to one core resulting in a short circuitHP, high pressure; HV, high voltage; LP, low pressure; LV, low voltagehe CC-BY license 
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Detailed trafﬁc delay calculations
Step 1: Determine which trafﬁc control plan replicates the trafﬁc
disruptions for the case study area under examination (see the paper
of Tighe et al. (1999) for examples), and the underlying
assumptions associated with it (e.g. lane width, length of detour,
partial/full closure of one lane, use of ﬂag person, use of signalised
zone and delays associated only with a speed reduction).
Step 2: Determine the total time duration caused by the trafﬁc
disruptions for the case study under examination.
Step 3: Determine the average annual daily trafﬁc (AADT) for the
case study area under examination. Ordinarily, the transport
authority in the country in question retains AADT data. In the UK,
AADT for any given road can be determined through the
Department for Transport’s trafﬁc count online database (Leduc,
2008). The AADT on a road segment can alternatively be estimated
by using Equation 3 where no ofﬁcial trafﬁc count data exists.
AADTS ¼
X365
j¼1
TF24s,j
3653.
where TF24s,j is the 24 h trafﬁc ﬂow on segment s at day j.
Step 4: Based on the trafﬁc control plan (1, 2 or 3, chosen after
Tighe et al. (1999); see below) and total duration time of trafﬁc
disruptions experienced as a result of the utility strike incident
(equations are provided for 40, 50, 80, 100, 160 and 200 h by Tighe
et al., 1999; the values calculated by the equations can be summed,
and thus a combination of the equations can be used), the appropriate
equation(s) can now be selected to determine the cost associated with
trafﬁc disruptions. The equations in Tables 5–7 are for a total
disruption time of 80 h using different trafﬁc control plans.
Trafﬁc control plan 1 refers to full closure of one lane and the use
of a ﬂag person or signalised zone to allow trafﬁc alternately to
bypass the roadworks and the assumption that the associated
delay will be a queuing delay. Trafﬁc control plan 2 refers to [ University of Birmingham] on [09/08/18]. Published with permission by the ICtrafﬁc diverting over a shoulder or being funnelled into a
narrower lane to bypass the roadworks, so the trafﬁc is still able
to proceed and delays would be associated with speed reductions
and queuing in times of high ﬂow. Trafﬁc control plan 3 refers to
full closure of the road and implementation of a trafﬁc diversion.
Step 5: Having calculated the delay time in step 4, it is proposed
to increase the delay by 40% using a ‘rule of thumb’
approximation for utility strikes in urban areas with a high
population density to account for the adverse impacts of queuing
trafﬁc related to noise pollution, air pollution, loss of business and
health issues (Goodwin, 2005; Lee et al., 2005; Weisbrod et al.,
2003). This rule of thumb should be used where the
corresponding data for quantifying these separate additional costs
as a result of the strike incident cannot be accessed (see the
publication of McMahon et al. (2005) for additional ICs and SCs
that may arise as a result of street works). However, this is where
engineering judgement can be brought into consideration to take
account of the context: roadworks that have to be extended in an
urban street adjacent to a school playground and close to a school
entrance with a heavy pedestrian footfall would attract, for
example, a greater multiplier for the additional impacts.
Step 6: It should be noted that the equations quoted by Tighe
et al. (1999) are computed in US dollars. If these equations are
utilised in other jurisdictions, the calculated cost value for trafﬁc
disruption should be subject to an appropriate currency
conversion.
Example illustrative calculations
For the new approach, utility strike cost estimation methodology,
trafﬁc delay quantiﬁcation will be illustrated in a concise manner
herein through case study 11.
Step 1: Trafﬁc control plan 3 (after Tighe et al. (1999)) was
implemented as a result of the utility strike incident.
Step 2: The trafﬁc delay impact was 3 weeks in total as a result of
the utility strike incident. Assuming that Sunday trading laws in
the UK make Sunday a half day based on a 10 h working day, the
trafﬁc delay impact is for 6·5 d/week.
total traffic delay due to strike incident
¼ 10  65ð Þ  3 ¼ 195 h ~ 200 hð Þ4.
Step 3: AADT for the case study area under examination = 8000Table 5. Trafﬁc control plan 1 – 80 hLane
width: mUtility strike
duration: hEquation R23·75 80 log(cost) = 0·00022AADT
+ 3·55560·982Table 6. Trafﬁc control plan 2 – 80 hLane
width: mUtility strike
duration: hEquation R23·75 80 log(cost) = 0·00038AADT
+ 1·80980·893Table 7. Trafﬁc control plan 3 – 80 hELane
width: m under the CCUtility strike
duration: h-BY license Equation R23·75 80 log(cost) = 0·00051AADT
+ 0·87800·89911
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DownloadStep 4: Trafﬁc control plan 3 with a total time duration of ~200 h
for a road with a lane width of 3·75 m results in the following
equation
log costð Þ ¼ 000051AADT þ 11690
¼ 000051  8000ð Þ þ 11690
cost ¼ 10 0000518000ð Þþ11690½  ¼ $177 4185.
Step 5: To account for additional impacts of queuing trafﬁc in a
dense built-up area for which no data were available, the rule of
thumb of 40% of the total trafﬁc delay time cost is applied
200 h  40 % ¼ 80 h additional costsð Þ6.
Trafﬁc control plan 3 with a total time duration of 80 h results in
the following equation
log costð Þ ¼ 000051AADT þ 08780
¼ 000051  8000ð Þ þ 08780
cost ¼ 10 0000518000ð Þþ08780½  ¼ $90 7827.
Step 6: Convert to pounds given that the case study under
examination is UK centric (£1 = $1·55 – (conversion rate taken in
April 2015, at the time of this study))
traffic delay cost £ð Þ ¼ 177 418 þ 90 782ð Þ=155
¼ £173 0328.
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